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1 Introduction 
Corruption is a phenomenon, which has always characterised human societies. It is not of 
today that men are pushed by the ambition and the love of money to have a behaviour, 
which goes against the common good. 
Many studies show that corruption could have a significantly negative impact on 
economic growth (Mauro, 1995, 1998; Bliss and Di Tella, 1997; Mo, 2001; Del Monte 
and Papagni, 2001). Corruption also reduces the legitimacy of government in the eyes of 
the governed (Anderson and Tdverdova, 2003) and could decrease the political stability. 
The level of corruption is a very important indicator of the quality of government, that is 
a key element to the ability of poor society to take advantage of the opportunities 
presented by relative backwardness. Therefore, the study of the causes of corruption is a 
very important topic, especially for backward areas. 
It is alone in the last two decades that in Europe the problem of corruption has entered 
the agenda of national governments and international organisations. This happened in 
concomitance with the growth, from the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, of 
the number of judicial inquiries for corruption crimes in many European countries: 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain. It is likely that the end of the cold war was among the 
main causes of this explosion. For all the period in which the threat of Communism was 
real both the judicial power and the press of various European countries realised an  
auto-censure with respect to all those facts that, putting under discussion the institutional 
power, could have mined the political stability. These qualms came less after the fall of 
the Wall of Berlin; on the other hand, there was grown a new class of judges, who were 
not afraid to be entered conflict with the political power and who were drawing their 
strength from a public opinion not more ready to accept corruption practices hided for 
long time. The impact of the  investigations  on the corrupt business–government 
relationship was very strong in Italy. That is intelligible since not only in Italy, at the 
beginning of the 1980s, had a corruption level, following Transparency International’s 
annual index of perceived corruption,1 much higher than that of the other European 
countries but this level has gone growing. Italy in the early 1990, ranked on 54 countries, 
at the 37th place as corruption intensity; it was the last among the industrialised countries 
and was preceded by many developing countries. 
On the other hand, even if with smaller intensity, the judicial inquiries have regarded 
other nations. The judicial inquiries concerning managers and the politicians in Germany 
were making write to Der Spiegel of January 18th, 1993: “the state the enterprise spoils 
has become the spoils of the parties and the parties”. The judicial inquiries in Germany 
initially have regarded managers (the Opel scandal) and smaller politicians; then inquiries 
have reached the political tops with the opening in 1995 of that against the dealer of  
K. Schreiber crews, which took to the resignation of the chancellor H. Khol to have 
accepted funds in favour of the Christian Democrat party. In France at the beginning of 
the 1990s the judicial inquiries regard a series of public and private enterprise managers 
(the president of Yves Saint Laurent, of Renault, of Paribas, of Bouygues, of Elf 
Aquitaine), of the Socialist Bernard Tapie to reach then the Gaullists Chirac, and to the 
ex Foreign country Minister Roland Dumas. In Spain the judicial Socialist exponent 
inquiries and took to the electoral Felipe Gonzales defeat some 1990s in the half of the 
establishment. 
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Table 1 shows the values of the CPI index from 1980 to 2003 for some European 
countries. In the 1980s, Italy showed high corruption if compared to other industrialised 
countries and, at least according to this index, corruption increased in Italy till 1996 and 
subsequently decreased. 
Table 1 Index of perceived corruption 
 1980–1985 1988–1992 1996 2002 2003 
Spain 6.82 5.06 4.31 7.10 6.9 
France 8.41 7.45 6.96 6.3 6.9 
Germany 8.14 8.13 8.27 7.3 7.7 
Italy 4.86 4.3 3.42 5.2 5.3 
Belgium 8.28 7.4 6.84 7.1 7.6 
UK 8.01 8.26 8.44 8.7 8.7 
Source: Transparency International. 
The judicial inquiries have, therefore, undoubtedly affected the electoral events of the 
various interested countries, but it is less clear whether they, independently of the result 
of a trial, have success in fighting corruption or not. A very superficial look to data 
relative to Italy and Spain allows some optimism. In these two countries corruption, after 
having a net trend of growth up to the half the 1990s, decreased in relation to judicial 
inquiries. 
The aim of this paper is to verify if these anti-corruption campaigns had success and 
if their effects will last in time, focusing on the case of Italy. The experience of many 
developing countries, characterised by widespread corruption, a low level of detection, 
and slow economic growth, in spite of deliberate attempts by the governments to deter 
bribery is not very encouraging. The case of a developed country as Italy is quite 
interesting as confirmation as much as highlighted in literature according to which only 
intense anticorruption campaigns could have a significant effect on the levels of regard 
corruption, but it is still to verify that the effects of this campaign will last long. Indeed, 
one may be worried that the systematic attack taken to the judicial power in Italy (already 
from the end of 1990) by many politicians and press would have success to spread the 
conviction that the judges have been moved from the desire to be the centre of attention 
and to change the results of the electoral mechanism. The weakening of the public 
opinion support in favour of judicial power may contribute to take back Italy towards 
those high levels of corruption, which only recently has removed. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews literature on the factors 
determining the dynamic of corruption and use a standard model of dynamic corruption 
to analyse the effects of anticorruption campaign. Section 3 analyses the dynamic of 
corruption in a group of countries and the factors that could explain why the level of 
corruption of a given country changes very slowly. Section 4 deals with the economic 
causes and social and political events that could have affected the dynamic of corruption 
in Italy. Section 5 presents the estimation of the effects of the anticorruption campaign of 
Mani Pulite. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 The dynamics of corruption 
One of the most interesting facts about corruption is that it varies greatly not only across 
countries but also during time within a given country. Some authors (Myrdal, 1968; 
Huntington, 1968) expect that, in the early stages of development, changes in social and 
economic systems generate greater opportunities for corruption. This explains the 
increase in corruption that is commonly assumed to have taken place in recent times with 
the gaining of independence and the transition from colonial status to self-government. 
We could expect rapid modernisation of undeveloped societies to increase corruption and 
only when market forces are well developed and society is governed by rational 
calculations of costs and returns corruption will decrease. From this theory we could 
expect, coeteris paribus, an inverted U relationship between corruption and economic 
development. In the early stage of growth corruption increases and then, after reaching a 
peak, it will decrease with the increase of economic development (Treisman, 2000). 
Therefore, we could expect a convergence in the level of corruption among countries, at 
least in the long run. 
In contrast with the above explanations, other theories (Andvig and Moene, 1990; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1999) emphasise that the same socio-economic structure can give rise to 
different levels of corruption. In such models the expected profitability of engaging in a 
corrupt transaction, as perceived by a particular individuals, depends on how many other 
individuals in the organisation or society are expected to be corrupt. There are many 
reasons why differences in profitability change as corruption changes: 
• it is more difficult to detect a corrupt transaction as corruption increases because the 
capacity of public investigations and prosecution may be strained 
• internalised moral feelings of guilt by breaking the rules decrease as the number of 
rule breakers increases 
• when many others engage in corruption the loss of reputation when discovered is 
likely to decrease. 
It is also possible that when the level of corruption is low or not very high it is positively 
correlated with corruption in the past period and, after a peak is reached, there is an 
inverse correlation. 
This explanation was formalised by Andvig and Moene (1990). In their model it is 
assumed that the expected punishments for detected corruption decline as more officials 
become corrupt because it is cheaper to be discovered by a corrupt than a non-corrupt 
superior. This model generates two stable stationary Nash-type equilibria and highlights 
how the profitability of corruption is positively related to its frequency and how a 
transparency shift may lead to a permanent change in corruption. The theoretical model 
of Andvig and Moene could explain how an anticorruption campaign, by increasing both 
the moral cost of the bribe and the probability of being discovered, could shift an 
economy from a high to a low equilibrium point of corruption. On the other hand, a stable 
increase in corruption could be the result of a process of weakening the political 
institutions and the sense of loyalty to organised society. The spread of corruption among 
minor officials could stem from a deterioration of the morals of some politicians and 
higher officials. In this case, it must be explained why there were such changes in social 
norms. A possible explanation is that they are caused by changes in the political system 
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(i.e., from democracy to dictatorship and vice versa) that affects the structure of the 
incentives to corruption (Golden, 2000). 
The above mechanisms have the potential to make corruption self-reinforcing. 
History has a prominent role to determine corruption: past levels of corruption affect the 
current corruption level. 
If we assume that moral cost of corruption are distributed between officials according 
to a cumulative density function we could have, in relation of the characteristics of the 
function, one (Figure 1) or multiple equilibriua (Figure 2). 
In Figure 1 the curve M describes the time path of C(t) as function of C(t – 1). In  
Figure 1, a straight line is drawn making a 45° angle with both axes. If anticorruption 
campaign increases moral costs of corruption the M curve could shift downward and the 
time path will cross the 45° line in point Z′ lower than Z. The economy converges to a 
lower level of corruption. But if anticorruption campaign does not affect the time path, 
but will act as a shock that decreases transitorily corruption, we will expect that after a 
while corruption will start again to growth. 
In Figure 2 the time path is an S-shaped curve that allows three points of equilibrium; 
stable low-corruption equilibrium (A); a stable high-corruption equilibrium C; an instable 
equilibrium in between (B). If the anticorruption campaign is successful but not very 
strong the time path will shift downward, but we still have multiple equilibria and the 
new high stable corruption equilibrium will have a lower value than the old one. 
Figure 1 The time path of corruption with stable equilibrium 
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Figure 2 Corruption and multiple equilibria 
 
A very strong anticorruption policy that moves the time path down the dotted line is 
required in Figure 2 to eliminate the high-corruption equilibrium and allow a country to 
move in the direction of the low-corruption equilibrium. Small changes in institutions 
that moves the time path down could reduce for while corruption but the country will still 
be caught in the corruption trap and will stay in a high-corruption equilibrium. 
Another interesting question that arises when one compares corruption in different 
countries or regions is about the relationship between the change of corruption and the 
initial level of corruption. In the case of one stable equilibrium (Figure 1), there is an 
inverse relationship between the change of corruption and the initial level of corruption. 
Assume that we have two regions (countries) and region A is less corrupt than region B. 
The two regions have similar institutions and move along the same time path. Both 
regions converge toward the equilibrium point Z and the rate of growth of corruption is 
higher in A than B. Therefore, we will expect positive rate of corruption and an inverse 
relationship between the growth of corruption and initial level of corruption. If, on the 
other hand, the level of corruption of region A and region B is at the left of the 
equilibrium point Z, the two regions will converge toward equilibrium Z and less corrupt 
region will be characterised by a decrease in corruption, lower in absolute value, than that 
of the more corrupt region. Corruption in more honest region will decrease at a lower rate 
than in the less honest one. 
We will expect that in a country where regions have a different level of corruption 
and the time path is that of Figure 1 if the anticorruption campaign is effective, the 
decrease of corruption will be in absolute value lower in less corrupt region, and the 
effect of the campaign will be positive and permanent with less corrupt regions growing 
at an higher rate than the more corrupt one. 
Suppose of estimating the rate of growth of corruption for a group of countries or 
regions, which has the same time path. If these countries (regions) have one stable 
equilibrium (Figure 1), we will expect a negative sign of b, the coefficient of the 
logarithm of the initial value of corruption. 
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where 
i: is the region 
t: is the final year 
t0: is the initial year 
Uit: is a random variable 
Cit: is the level of corruption of region i at time t 
Ci,t0: is the level of corruption of region i at time t0 
S: is a vector of control of variables. 
When there are multiple equilibria, as in Figure 2, it is more difficult to say a priori what 
is the sign of the relationship between the rate of growth of corruption and the initial 
value of corruption. If the two regions have levels of corruption not very different, and 
not very far from the stable equilibrium, an inverse relationship still will hold. But if one 
region is in proximity of the low-corruption equilibrium and the other is in proximity of 
the high-corruption equilibrium we cannot say anything about the relationship between 
the rate of growth of corruption of a region and its initial value. 
In order to evaluate empirically if an anticorruption campaign has determined 
temporary or permanent changes of corruption we propose the following methodology. 
The first step does consist in estimating the time path of corruption; then, it is possible to 
compute the steady state values before and after the beginning of the anti-corruption 
campaign; last, one has to compare these steady state values. If the equilibrium value 
relative to the period after the anti-corruption campaign is smaller than that relative to the 
period before it is possible to argue that the anti-corruption campaign has been 
successful. 
Empirical analysis could helps to elucidate some of the problems that the above 
analysis has shown. 
3 The persistency of corruption: an empirical analysis 
An important aspect of corruption is that it has proved to be remarkably persistent.  
The main reason is that, as Andvig and Moene model shows, higher is the diffusion of 
corruption lower is the incentive for individuals to be honest. In this section, we will 
perform a descriptive analysis of the problem of convergence in the level of corruption in 
a group of 54 countries. In Table 2, we considered for a group of 21 European countries 
the value of Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index during the periods 
1980–1985 and 2000–2005. The index shows a substantial stability of corruption in  
the periods considered, also if some large variations could have been happened in 
between. 
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Table 2 Transparency international corruption perceptions index 1980–1985 and 2000–2005, 
European countries 
 1980–1985 2000–2005 ∆ of the index 
Norway 8.41 8.80 0.39 
Switzerland 8.41 8.90 0.49 
Netherlands 8.41 8.80 0.39 
France 8.41 6.95 –1.46 
Ireland 8.28 7.33 –0.96 
Belgium 8.28 7.40 –0.88 
Finland 8.14 9.52 1.38 
Germany 8.14 7.85 –0.29 
Denmark 8.01 9.39 1.38 
Sweden 8.01 9.18 1.17 
UK 8.01 8.65 0.64 
Austria 7.35 8.23 0.88 
Spain 6.82 7.03 0.21 
Czech. Rep. 5.13 4.03 –1.11 
Russia* 5.13 2.65 –2.48 
Italy 4.86 5.08 0.22 
Portugal 4.46 6.43 1.97 
Greece 4.2 4.28 0.08 
Turkey 4.06 3.25 –0.81 
Poland 3.64 3.63 –0.02 
Hungary 1.63 4.88 3.25 
*URSS during the period 1980–1985. 
Source: Transaparency International. 
In Table 3 we considered the group of 54 countries for which it was possible to build the 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index starting from 1980. Three states 
of corruption are considered: low (value from seven to ten), medium (value from four to 
six), high (value less than four). The three states are on the first vertical column. On the 
rows there is the percentage of countries that, for each state, changed the value of the 
index of corruption from 1980 to 2005. Such changes could be positive or negative. 
Table 3 Persistency of corruption 
Negative changes  Positive changes State of 
corruption, 
1980–1985 4–3 3–2 2–1 1–0 0–1 1–2 2–3 3–4 
Total 
Absolute 
value 
High – – – 0.18 0.35 0.35 0.06 0.06 17 
Medium – 0.31 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.06 – – 16 
Low – 0.05 0.05 0.29 0.43 0.19 – – 21 
Distribution of changes (percentage) in the value of corruption perception index during 
the period 1980–2005 by country’s level of corruption in 1980–1985. 
High Level of corruption: value of corruption perception index 0 – <4 
Average Level of corruption: value of corruption perception index 4 – <7 
Low Level of corruption: value of corruption perception index 7–10. 
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As expected, 82% of countries with high level of corruption registered a decrease in the 
level of corruption. But 69% of the countries with medium level of corruption 
experienced an increase in their level of corruption. On the other hand, 62% of countries 
with a low level of corruption registered a decrease in the level of corruption. 
A possible interpretation of these results is that countries with high level of corruption 
could, through adequate policies, decrease corruption and eventually go to the state of 
medium corruption. But, once that a country is in this state, there is an high probability 
that it will return to the situation of high corruption. On the other hand, the probability 
that a country with low corruption fell in a state of higher corruption is low. 
Therefore, the hope that with anticorruption campaigns corrupted countries could 
decrease substantially their corruption in few years is very low. 
In the sample of 54 countries there is no linear negative relationship between the 
change in corruption and the initial level of corruption. Our data do not confirm the 
hypothesis that high-corrupted economies tend to have a decrease in corruption faster 
than low corrupted economies, as modernisation theories would expect, at least once is 
reached a given level of development. The relationship between the positive change in 
corruption (decrease in corruption) and initial level of corruption is not linear (see  
Figure 3). The changes in corruption are not linearly correlated with the initial state of 
corruption. Descriptive analysis shows that there is a corruption trap from which it is very 
difficult to exit. Figure 3 and Table 3 give an evidence of this corruption trap: 
• high-corrupt country has a high probability to pass to a medium state of corruption 
and then fall again in the high-corrupt state 
• an average corrupted country have an higher probability to fall in a state of high 
corruption than to pass to a state of lower level of corruption 
• a low corrupt country has a very high probability to stay in this state. 
A more robust analysis is done in the following, when we will examine the Italian case, 
because we have information on the level of corruption for Italian provinces and for a 
quite long period of time. 
Figure 3 Absolute change in the level of corruption during the period 1985–2005 relative to the 
level of corruption in 1985 
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4 The determinants of corruption: the Italian case 
4.1 Corruption in Italy 
In a book published in 1974 on the peculiarities of the Italian political system (Cavazza 
and Graubard, 1974) there were several essays on the mechanisms that have resulted in 
the stability of the Italian political system, on the one hand, and the inefficiency of public 
administration, on the other. One of the most important mechanisms was the system of 
political patronage, in Italian called clientelismo, that allowed groups of citizens linked 
directly to politicians to reap high rewards through special laws (leggine) or through 
political appointments. Such rewards and appointments were not aimed at enhancing 
efficiency or recruiting professional expertise. The interaction between politicians, 
bureaucracy and groups of citizens directly linked to politicians was a characteristic of 
the Italian political system, but it was only in the early 1970s that political corruption 
began to spread.2 So, in the book corruption was never considered a major problem of the 
Italian economy. 
However, in the 1980s corruption began to be seen as a problem and a growing 
number of citizens became intolerant to its spread (Cazzola, 1988). The different 
emphasis laid on corruption in the two periods, from the Second World War to the 1970s 
and later, is probably caused by the much higher spread, in the 1980s, of bribes in 
relations between citizens and public administration. 
4.2 The dynamics of corruption crimes since 1963 
The statistical evidence for this increase in corruption is given by the amount of 
corruption crime per capita detected by Italian law. The number of crimes against public 
administration that we consider is based on Statutes No. 286–294 (ISTAT- Annals  
of Judicial Statistics). We exclude other statutes of crimes against the P.A. that do not 
involve crimes of corruption such as Statute 279–insulting a public officer (oltraggio al 
pubblico ufficiale)–or Statute 295–neglect or refusal of an official duty (omissione  
o rifiuto di atti di ufficio). 
This index is available for the period 1963–2001 and its dynamic is shown in  
Figure 4. The figure shows the number of corruption crimes, on a per capita basis, in Italy 
and in the Mezzogiorno. 
Figure 4 Crimes of corruption in Italy and Southern Italy in the period 1963–2001 
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The index is not a measure of real corruption crimes, but only of the crimes reported to 
the police, and hence it has the drawback of underestimating the true phenomenon.  
Two other important criticisms could be levelled at the use of this index to evaluate the 
dynamics of corruption. First, many corruption crimes reported in year t were committed 
in year t – x. Therefore, such crimes may have been committed under different 
circumstances (i.e., the institutional/legal framework when the crimes were committed 
was different from the year of the report). Secondly, an increase in the number of 
recorded crimes does not necessarily mean that the real number of crimes has increased. 
There may have been only an increase in willingness to report crimes or the reporting 
capacity of the police/judicial legal institutions may have improved. 
In the Italian case the first criticism does not apply as there was–at least until  
1993–no change in the law on corruption. After 1993 the only important change in the 
law on corruption was the increase in penalties. As regards the second point, we checked 
the dynamics of the index based on reported crimes against that of another index of 
corruption widely used in econometrics. 
This second index is the Transparency International’s annual index of perceived 
corruption (CPI). This index is built using a series of surveys and is thus not subject to 
the criticism levelled above. Transparency International and Goettingen University have 
published historical data from 54 countries in all. Transparency International’s annual 
index of perceived corruption is available only from 1980. 
In Table 4 we compare the performance of the two corruption indexes in the last two 
decades. The number of corruption crimes is compared with an index given by (10-CPI). 
We call the first index IOC and the second index IPC. For both indexes we have set the 
1980–1985 value at 100. Interestingly, the dynamics of both indexes (Figure 5) are very 
similar in the period 1980–2000. Both indexes show an increase in corruption till 1995, 
and then a decrease after this year. 
Table 4 Indexes of corruption in Italy in the period 1980–2003 
Years Perceived corruption index = 10-CPI Corruption crime per capita 
1980–1985 100 100.00 
1988–1992 111 157.6 
1995 136 319.2 
1996 128 268.1 
1997 97 244.4 
1998 105 265.3 
1999 103 224.2 
2000 105 150.6 
2001 88 195.1 
2002 93 N.A. 
2003 91 N.A. 
Base year 1980–1985 = 100. N.A. means not available. 
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Figure 5 A comparison of the time-series of two corruption indexes for Italy 
 
The correlation coefficient between these two indexes during the period 1995–2001 
amounts to 0.70 and seems quite high if we take account of major differences that lie 
behind the construction of the two indexes. In fact, while the IOC is made up by counts 
of crimes, hence every crime has the same weight, the CPI derives from surveys of 
opinions that are qualitative in nature even if they are summarised in a quantitative index. 
The fact that the index of corruption based on official data has a similar trend to that 
based on surveys reassures us that the former captures the real phenomenon. 
Another possible criticism of the index based on corruption crime per capita is that it 
could be affected by a systematic bias owing to differences among regions between the 
actual number of corruption crimes and the number reported and detected by the police. 
Empirical evidence shows that we might expect modest systematic differences between 
regions in the proportion of detected corruption crimes to actual ones.3 
4.3 The causes of corruption in Italy 
There are three main aspects of corruption shown in Figure 5. The first is that corruption 
crimes in Italy increased steadily between the mid 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. 
The question, which needs answering is why Italy shifted from a system of political 
patronage, that is a form of constituency service that uses the power of politicians over 
public administration to benefit specific named clientele, to a system of political 
corruption that involves legislators, bureaucrats and businessmen. 
The second aspect is that corruption is higher in southern Italy than in northern Italy. 
So one must explain the differences in the level of corruption between North and South. 
The third aspect is the decrease in corruption after 1993. This decrease could be a 
consequence of the so-called Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) campaign that probably affected 
expectations on the profitability of corruption, as people saw that legislators, 
administrators and the judges were intent on enforcing the integrity of public officials at 
all levels. After 2000, the decrease in the level of corruption in Italy stopped. 
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Therefore, an explanation of corruption in Italy must deal with these three aspects. 
There could be many possible causes behind the spread of corruption in Italy, such as the 
rise of federalism, the increase in state intervention and the rise of a new ruling class 
without the ideals of politicians who built the Italian Republic after World War II. 
Recently Golden (2000), suggested that in the 1970s there was a large exogenous 
increase in the incentives for political corruption both from the demand and the supply 
side. The reasons pointed out by Golden were the following. 
• The passing of a law on the funding of political parties in 1974 that prohibited public 
companies from donating money to political parties or electoral campaigns. By 
making such donations illegal, the law on public financing criminalised existing 
practices. 
• The change in the leadership of the Socialist Party, a very important ally of the 
government, that for a variety of reasons transformed Italy’s political system in the 
1980s into one characterised by massive political corruption. 
• The collective incumbency advantage of the Democristiani (Christian Democrats) 
had by the late 1970s become stronger than ever. There was a belief–perhaps most 
notably among Socialist politicians–that Italy had no genuine political opposition or 
alternative government, and that governing parties were invulnerable. As a result, 
facilitating services could be priced. 
• The lack of foreign competition for government contracts gave Italian firms the 
economic possibility and the incentives to pay the bribes expected of them. 
Besides the above causes a very important one could be the rise in corruption linked to 
the institutional development of federalism in Italy. In the last 30 years Italy has gone 
through many institutional reforms from a highly centralised model to a decentralised 
one. The 1948 constitution considered five ‘special regions’, three located on national 
borders (Val d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia) and two islands  
(Sicily and Sardinia). The law to create ‘ordinary regions’ was passed in 1968 and the 
first regional councils were elected in June 1970. Two years were required for central 
government to issue decrees transferring powers, funds and personnel to regions, so that 
only in 1972 were regional governments operative. In 1985 Law 382 was passed 
authorising the decentralisation of important new functions to the regions. Central 
authorities retained general powers of ‘direction and coordination’ over regional affairs 
but most regional funds came from the centre in the form of general purpose and special 
purpose transfers. 
Decentralisation of functions and central allocation of resources made politicians 
irresponsible and reduced incentives to allocate resources efficiently. For politicians the 
probability of being elected was much more linked to the number of favori (favours) that 
they could offer their ‘clients’ than to the efficiency of public expenditure and the 
probability of being apprehended.4 Further decentralisation increased the number of 
politicians: the new entrants had to fund their own electoral campaigns and were driven 
to use resources from bribery to do so. As taxes and benefits were the exclusive domain 
of national government, local politicians were much more interested in obtaining more 
resources from central government than using them efficiently. The decentralisation of 
functions from central governments to local governments (the power to issue licences, the 
power to hire new staff, the power to choose the projects to finance, etc.) increased the 
opportunities of corruption (Amato, 1982; Cassese, 1986).5 
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All the above causes decreased the cost of corruption and, in the framework of the 
Andvig and Moene model, a self-reinforcing mechanism of corruption started. Italy 
began a path toward a higher level of equilibrium of corruption that resulted in the 
dynamics shown in Figure 1. The peak was reached in 1995, and after that year 
corruption decreased. The reasons of this decrease mainly lie in institutional change.  
In Italy, as in other European countries, the wave of opinion against corrupt practices 
started at the beginning of the 1990s and peaked in the second half of the decade. 
Moreover, in the first half of the 1990s, in Italy was realised the strong anti-corruption 
campaign of Mani Pulite; the number of trials per corruption crime had already increased 
steadily from year 1989. The reaction of the public at large led to the downfall of the two 
main governing political parties, the Christian Democrats and Socialists. Corrupt 
practices that were tolerated as long as the danger of communism prevented any serious 
challenge to institutional power were no longer accepted after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
But in Italy there were also economic reasons for the campaign against corruption.  
For the Italian economy the cost of corrupted practices had become increasingly high and 
it was one of the causes of the very large budget deficit.6 Thus, ordinary citizens and 
business people supported magistrates investigating cases of political corruption. By the 
end of 1995 Italy’s anticorruption magistrates had gone on to arrest more than 1300 top 
business people, civil servants and politicians. We will analyse deeply in Section 5 the 
effects of the anticorruption campaign on the diffusion of bribery. Italy’s indexes, based 
on detected crimes, probably recorded the change in trend with a delay of one or two 
years. 
Another reason for the decrease in corruption is owing to the institutional change of 
the electoral system. In 1993 Law 81 changed the system to make the Mayor, the 
President of the Provincial Authority and the President of the Regional Authority 
electoral offices. The new system made the mayor and other presidents much more 
independent of political parties and therefore more able to resist the pressure of lobbies 
than in the past. The new system weakened the extensive use of political patronage, one 
of the most important determinants of corruption (Geddes, 1997).7 Therefore, one would 
expect the new reform to reduce corruption. Other reasons are connected with the 
decrease in public expenditure. 
4.4 The determinants of differences in corruption across Italian regions 
The changes in the dynamic of corruption are only one part of the story as there is 
another aspect related to differences in corruption across regions. Figure 4 shows that 
there are great differences in the level of corruption between northern and southern  
Italy. A possible explanation is that these differences are caused by cultural  
reasons. The interesting thing is the persistence of such differences during the period 
1963–2001. 
Many studies have shown that the distribution of civic values among Italian regions is 
not uniform: in this distribution the gap between North and South has been exemplified in 
the ‘amoral familism’ theory: “Maximise the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear 
family: assume that all others will do likewise” (Banfield, 1958). Putnam (1993) 
computed the level of ‘civic-ness’ of each of Italy’s 20 regions in 1970 and found a lower 
index in southern Italian regions and remarkable concordance between the performance 
of regional governments and the degree to which social and political life in those regions 
approximates to the ideal of civic community.8 He found a parallel between the various 
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regimes that characterised Italy at the beginning of the 14th century and the distribution 
of civic norms.9 
On the other hand, it could be maintained, following the modernisation theory that 
corruption in southern regions is higher because they are undergoing the process of 
modernisation that northern regions have already experienced. 
Another reason for the differences in the corruption level between Italian regions 
could be the greater state intervention in the South. In Italy state intervention was quite 
high and increasing until the end of 1980s. In the southern less developed regions after 
the Second World War the state intervention was heavier than in northern regions.  
The share of public consumption on GDP was much higher for southern regions than for 
northern regions and at least until 1990 the southern regions received a higher level of 
public investment per capita. Hence, if public expenditure has an influence on corruption, 
higher corruption in Southern regions should be accounted for by variables that measure 
the extent of public policy. Even if by the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s the weight of 
the state in the economy reduced, the privatisation process10 gave new opportunities for 
corruption. 
Another variable that could explain the difference in corruption across regions is 
related to the degree of competition between political parties. We could expect a higher 
level of corruption in regions dominated for long time by one political party. 
In a recent work, Del Monte and Papagni (2006) estimated an econometric model of 
the causes of corruption in Italy of which we give the main results in Table 5. 
• Level of development. There is an inverted U relationship between the diffusion of 
corruption and the share of agriculture value-added11 (proxy for the level of 
development). This result accords with international evidence that is based on 
different indicators of corruption (Bardhan, 1997). 
• Public intervention. There is a positive effect of public expenditure for consumption 
goods on corruption. Also the squared value of public consumption enters estimates 
with significant parameters. (The result accords with the Acemoglu and Verdier 
(2000) model). The coefficient of expenditure on public infrastructure was not 
significant. 
• Civic virtues. In regions where the majority of population usually participate in 
national elections (low absenteeism), there is lower diffusion of illegal behaviour in 
public administration. 
Voluntary Organisations (seen as proxy of social capital) have a negative influence 
on the level of corruption. Larger the number of voluntary organisation p.h. lower is 
the level of corruption.12 
• Political competition. Estimated parameters strongly justify the drawing of a  
U-shaped relation between corruption and political concentration. This result accords 
with a view of political competition and lobbying where fragmentation and high 
concentration are both negative contexts and virtue lies in the middle. 
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Table 5 Relationship between the level of corruption in Italy, socio-economic variables 
Factors Theoretical hypothesis Econometric estimation 
Socio cultural theories 
Electoral Absenteeism + + 
Vigorous civic associations – – 
Degree of economic development (share of 
agricultural value added on total value added) 
? + 
(non-linear) 
Political theories 
Decentralisation + Not significant 
Political concentration  + + 
U relationship 
Economic theories 
Weight of public administration in the 
economy 
+  
Public consumption expenditure p.h + + 
Investment in infrastructure p-h + Not significant 
+Positive correlation between the degree of corruption and the intensity of considered 
variable. 
–Negative correlation between the degree of corruption and the intensity of considered 
variable. 
5 The effect of Clean Hands on the level of corruption in Italy 
There is a widespread opinion that the Clean Hands’ anticorruption campaign had a 
positive effect on corruption. 
In a survey conducted at the end of 1993 among 786 Italian young entrepreneurs, 
42% of them declared that corruption had been greatly reduced, 40% slightly reduced, 
6% declared that the phenomenon of corruption had disappeared and 13% declared that 
the intensity of corruption was the same as before.13 
A systematic analysis of the relationship between corruption and public spending and 
of the impact of Clean Hands on the level of corruption has been developed by Acconcia 
and Cantabene (2006), using a panel data set for Italian regions and provinces over the 
period 1980–2001. In particular, the paper documents a story of success in deterring 
corruption, showing that the relationship between corruption and public investment in 
infrastructure is positive and statistically significant before Clean Hands, while it is no 
more statistically significant in the second half of the 1990s (Cantabene, 2005).14  
The authors use two proxies of bureaucratic corruption: the number of corruption crimes 
prosecuted (at provincial level), and the number of public officials convicted for the 
crime of embezzlement (at regional level). The authors, using different types of 
estimators, find that mainly investment in social infrastructure (public buildings, swamp 
and land reclamation) and public spending in social security have tempted public officials 
to become corrupt, and that Clean Hands had success in deterring corruption because it 
broke up the perverse relationship between public expenditure and corruption. 
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Similar conclusions are reported in Table 6. We use the methodology described in 
Section 2 in order to evaluate the effect of Clean Hands, running cross sectional 
regressions separately for the period before Clean Hands (1980–1994), and for the period 
after Clean Hands (1995–2001). The corruption index, C, is represented by the number of 
recorded corruption crimes, for which the judicial authority has begun the penal action, 
relative to the population. Differently for the estimation of the determinants of corruption 
in Italy, discussed in the previous section, we will use provinces and not regions as 
observations. This allows us to exploit the spatial dimension of the phenomenon using a 
large set of observations; indeed we have 80 observations in the period 1980–1994 and 
94 observations in the period 1995–2002. In order to evaluate the time path of corruption 
before and after the anticorruption campaign, we estimate the following equation for the 
two periods (before and after Clean Hands) 
0
0
,
,
log log
  = + +   
it
i t t
i t
C a b C u
C
 (2) 
where i represents the province and t the year. 
Table 6 The effect of Clean Hands: estimated results 
Period Log Ci,t0 Constant N.Obs R2 Steady state value 
1980–1994 –0.8521 
(–9.33) 
–2.4867 
(–5.76) 
85 0.47 0.053 
1995–2002 –0.6434 
(–7.41) 
–2.4168 
(–8.30) 
94 0.30 0.023 
Log Ci,t0 = logarithm of the index of corruption at the initial time (1980 or 1995).  
Values of t-statistic in parentheses. 
A problem could arise when using a convergence equation in order to estimate the steady 
state value of corruption, because in different provinces corruption does not necessarily 
converge to the same steady state. However, the provinces share a common central 
government, have similar institutional set-up and legal system, thus they exhibit similar 
initial conditions, allowing us the estimation of equation (2). Arguably, the estimation of 
a convergence equation for corruption is more likely to apply across provinces within a 
country than, for example, across countries. 
The coefficients of the initial level of corruption are significantly negative in both 
periods, hence there is a significant tendency towards convergence in the level of 
corruption across Italian provinces and the R2 of the regression before Clean Hands is 
0.47. Moreover, we argue that there is a stable equilibrium since the time path generated 
by the estimated equations is damped without oscillation. According to the methodology 
previous described, we calculate the steady state values of corruption in the two periods 
and then we compare them. The equilibrium value (0.053) is higher for the equation 
estimated before Clean Hands than for that estimated for the period after the start of 
Clean Hands (0.023). This result shows that the effect of Clean Hands is not temporary. 
The first criticism that could be done to our analysis is that we do not consider control 
variables in the econometric specification. Therefore, the difference in the steady state 
values could be caused by changes in other variables not linked to Clean Hands. 
According to the theory, economic and cultural variables may affect corruption. 
However, specific economic variables that could have influence on corruption were also 
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affected by Clean Hands. For example, after Clean Hands there was a fall in the price of 
public works measured in physical units. Therefore, when using public works as control 
variable an endogeneity problem could arise. Moreover, to correctly estimate the effect of 
public works on corruption one has to use physical units and not monetary units at fixed 
prices. The problem of how to measure public works could be of particular relevance in a 
cross-section estimation before and after Clean Hands, because in this case differences in 
the two periods between physical and monetary value could determine biased 
estimation.15 
Cultural variables may be important in Italy, a country characterised by differences in 
cultural values between Southern and Northern provinces, thus to take care of such 
differences could be correct. Unfortunately, we do not have data about such variables in 
the two periods at level of province. However, it could be correct do not take care of such 
differences if one assumes that Clean Hand affected with same intensity Northern and 
Southern Regions. 
We argue that Clean Hands was a social phenomenon which determined a wave of 
popular indignation that changed the Italian Political System (see previous sections) and 
increased moral cost of corruption, not only the probability of punishment. As we 
consider Clean Hands a social and not only a judicial phenomenon, we think it is more 
correct to estimate the relationship between the rate of growth of corruption and its initial 
value without add control variables. 
6 Conclusions 
Our paper investigated the persisting of corruption phenomenon in Italy and in other 
countries. The main conclusion of our work is that anticorruption campaigns have 
permanent effects if they intervene at the same time on economic, political and cultural 
factors. The incentive structure faced by bureaucrats, member of government, people 
engaged in market exchange is the results of the above factors and one must intervene on 
all of these to fight corruption in an effective way.16 
The experience of an industrialised country, as Italy, which is characterised by a set 
of constitutional rules typical of the Democracies in Western World, shows that 
economic and political factors alone could not prevent that industrialised countries fall in 
the corruption trap. Summarising, the Italian experience shows that: 
• An industrialised country could fall in a corruption trap. 
• Cultural and institutional variables (simplifying and increasing the transparency of 
public administration, choosing public administrators on the basis of merit and not of 
political links, and approving a law that prevents corrupt politicians being reelected 
after initial proof of guilt) are more important than economic variables in shaping the 
incentive structure that favour corruption. Such institutional changes are very 
important to create a favourable climate to fight corruption; economic incentives, 
alone, are extremely unlikely to be a solution to the corruption problem. 
• A successful anticorruption campaign must intervene at the same time on economic 
and political-cultural variables. 
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On the other hand, our paper shows that, on the basis the Transparency Perception Index, 
some democratic country scores less than some dictatorial (or less democratic) country. 
In 2003 Singapore, where a single party held the power from the independence, was less 
corrupt than most industrialised countries and Botswana, where a single party held the 
power for more than 30 years was less corrupt than Italy, Greece, South Korea and 
Brazil, etc. In Asia, China that is a one party country, scored better than India that is a 
democracy. In one party country if members are highly motivated to national welfare 
government members could behave more as benevolent autocrats than as a kleptocrats 
(Myrdal, 1968, p.938). We agree that in most cases a stable democracy limits the 
incentive of corruption, but if each follows its own interest the democracy will be chaotic 
and opportunities of corruption will increase. 
The same is true for economic factors alone. In the Italian case a reduction in the state 
economic intervention in 1990 has been much less important than institutional changes 
and anti-corruptions campaigns as Mani Pulite to fight corruption. We must also 
remember that USA, the country considered the example of free market economy, scored 
only in 18 positions as value of the Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index, when countries where the state economic intervention is much higher, as Finland, 
Singapore and Sweden scored much better. 
Cultural factors that could have effect on civic virtues could have a very great 
importance in explaining differences in corruption. In Italy differences in civic virtues 
could explain the gap in the level of corruption between Northern and Southern regions. 
Therefore, a permanent decline in corruption could occur only when institutional 
structure and educational practices supported by precise non-discretionary rules and 
procedures for political, administrative and economic decisions will be created. Changing 
in the ruling party alone or economic reforms alone could not change the incentive 
structure that lead to corruption. 
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Notes 
1The index is constructed by a team of researchers at Goettingen University from a number of 
annual surveys. The index relates to the perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by 
business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between ten (highly honest) and 
zero (highly corrupt). The Transparency International’s annual index of perceived corruption (CPI) 
is available from 1980 only for 54 countries. 
2There were many cases of political corruption even before the war. We recall the Banca Romana 
case under the Giolitti Government. In the period 1880–1976 in the Corriere della Sera newspaper 
only very important national cases of corruption are reported (Cazzola, 1988). However, it was 
only after 1976 that political corruption became a serious phenomenon, and it was possible to read 
newspaper reports about corruption in many parts of Italy. 
3In a paper by Del Monte and Papagni (2006) a regression of the effect of an index of judicial 
efficiency on corruption crimes was carried out and a positive but not significant parameter was 
found. 
4In many elections the politicians suspected of bribery, as soon as they became eligible again, were 
reelected. 
5This view was shared by Amato (1982) and Cassese (1986). 
6Immediately after Mani Pulite there was a reduction in the cost of public works for government. 
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7However, one of the effects of such a reform is to increase political stability that is considered 
another variable that affects corruption. The argument in favour of a positive relationship between 
corruption and political stability is as follows: when a new party comes to power it will have more 
incentive to reform the corrupt practices of its predecessor (Geddes, 1997, p.12). Political stability 
provides the time for reputations to build and relationships to form across the public-private border 
in which both sides can have confidence. Thus, while increasing the potential loss if bureaucrats 
are fired, political stability might actually increase the expected return to corruption. 
8There are four indicators of civic sociability considered by Putnam: 
• the vibrancy of association life 
• the incidence of newspaper readership 
• the electoral turn-out in the referenda 
• the incidence of preference voting. 
The four indicators are highly correlated in the sense that regions with a high turnout for referenda 
and low use of the personal preference ballot are virtually the same regions with a high diffusion 
of civic association and a high incidence of newspaper readership. 
9The southern territories once ruled by Norman kings constituted the seven least civic regions in the 
1970s. The Papal States (minus the communal republics that lay in the northern section of the 
Pope’s domain) correspond to the next three or four regions up the civic ladder in 1970. At the end 
of the scale the heartland of republicanism in 1300 corresponds to the more civic regions of today, 
followed closely by the areas still further north in which republican tradition, though real, had 
proved somewhat weaker. 
10The recent SME case where businessmen and politicians corrupted judges to obtain positive 
verdicts is a good example of such opportunities. 
11While evaluating the non-linear effects of the share of agriculture in GDP and of the index of 
political concentration, it must be considered that both variables assume values in the range (0, 1). 
12See Putnam (1993) and Del Monte and Papagni for an explanation of this relationship. 
13“Sviluppo, criminalità e corruzione”, Quale Impresa, No. 7, 1994. 
14Preliminary results along this line are in Cantabene (2005), who uses a cross sectional regression 
for Italian provinces over the periods before (1985–1994) and after (1995–1999) Clean Hands. 
15Assume that public expenditure is the product of T transactions of equal cost c. Some of these 
transactions are performed by corrupted employees that ask a bribe b for transaction. The price of 
these transactions is c(1 + b). Other transactions are not performed by corrupted employees and 
their cost is c. Given the same number of transactions the effect of Clean Hands could be to 
reduce b and the number of corrupted transactions and corrupted employees. Therefore, public 
expenditure, given T, has a value that depends from b and the number of corrupted employees. 
But the index of corruption (the dependent variable) is a proxy for the number of corrupted 
transactions. Therefore, public expenditure is not independent from the dependent variable. This 
problem could always arise when one uses public expenditure as explanatory variable but the bias 
is greater if the relationship between the number of total transactions and the number of corrupted 
transactions is affected by structural changes between two periods, i.e., the effect of an 
anticorruption campaign. 
16Relative integrity in politics and administration was achieved in many industrialised countries 
(Great Britain, Holland and Scandinavian) as the result of a highly complex interaction between 
different cultural, political and economic forces. 
The transitions from the mercantilism to a free market economy in Northern European State 
allowed the creation of a political and administrative system efficient and not corrupt. When the 
state again intervened in the economy at a large scale, institutional changes in the governing rules 
by politician and bureaucrats and cultural change in people behaviour were enough strong that 
corruption continued to decrease. 
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